

VZCZCXRO1222
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHLO #1553 1561606
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041606Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8838
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001553

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA/DEAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [EUN](#) [UK](#)
SUBJECT: UK FEELS U.S. PAIN BUT OFFERS LITTLE LOVE ON
U.S.-EU SUMMIT DECLARATION

REF: STATE 57696

Classified By: Minister Political Counselor Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) The UK does not itself strongly object to the proposed U.S. language on Cuba and Venezuela in the U.S.-EU Summit document, but is bowing to the "significant" opposition of other EU Members and will not break rank on including U.S. language. Polcounselor delivered ref message on June 3 to Matthew Forbes, of the Foreign Office's Central America Office, and Michael Grace, the EU Policy Coordinator at the North America Desk. On Cuba, Forbes said that although the HMG "understands the arguments for specific mention of Cuba in the text," London recognizes the validity of the position strongly advocated by other EU Members, such as Spain and Italy, that a reference to Cuba this year would be counterproductive because the EU may decide days after the Summit to engage in dialogue with Havana and lift certain sanctions. A critical Cuba-specific reference would likely poison the environment for the launch of a successful dialogue; Havana had "already indicated" it would be a red flag if the Declaration contained specific language on Cuba, Forbes claimed. Forbes acknowledged that this argument was in effect holding the text hostage to an EU decision not yet taken, but those EU states which held this position were adamant that the risks outweighed the benefits of a Cuba reference. HMG, Forbes said, had decided to accept this tactical argument. Forbes was pessimistic that, despite the USG's willingness to work with the EU on how Cuba was referenced in the text, any agreement on a specific mention of Cuba was possible given "how strongly other EU members are on this point."

¶2. (C) Forbes said that the UK position was similar regarding a specific reference to Venezuela. The UK generally did not object, but other EU Members strongly believed it was counterproductive -- Forbes singled out Germany and Spain -- and the UK did not see any room for compromise.

¶3. (C) Forbes and Grace were less familiar with the U.S. language on the FARC and the U.S.-Colombia FTA. Neither said that they could speak definitively, but both expressed some surprise that there were objections to the U.S. language, especially on the FTA. Both pledged to bring U.S. concerns and language to the attention of the relevant Foreign Office officials working on those sections of the draft declaration.

Missile Defense

¶4. (C) Michael Grace, of the U.S. Desk, said that the UK was still considering the proposed U.S. language on missile defense, but London's initial view is that such a reference is best kept out of the EU context and is more appropriate for inclusion in a NATO text and discussions. Grace said he

would press his Foreign Office colleagues for more specificity on the UK view, but said he understood other EU Members are strongly opposed and the current language may be as much as "the traffic can bear" on the EU side.
Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:United_Kingdom
LeBaron